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Many statistical data, from medicine to social and economics statistics, are multinomial, i.e. the observations fall into one
of several unordered categories. In this paper, we present a powerful approach to learning from multinomial data with at
most KP 3 different categories, where K is explicitly known. The approach provides us with upper and lower probabilities
for (a) future observation(s), and it appears to be an attractive alternative to Walley’s Imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM) [1],
and the corresponding Imprecise Dirichlet-Multinomial model (IDMM) [2], which have attracted considerable attention in a
variety of different applications (see, in particular, the survey by Bernard [3] and this special issue of International Journal of
Approximate Reasoning). References on the general problem of predictive inference from categorical data, which has a pow-
erful history in statistics (the ‘rule of succession’ problem), can be obtained e.g. from [2] and [4].
Our approach relies on the general framework of ‘nonparametric predictive inference’ (NPI) [5,6], which is based on Hill’s
assumption A(n) [7]. By using the same variation of this assumption as presented in [8], called ‘circular-A(n)’, our method of
inference is closely related to our approach sketched in [8] where we explicitly do not assume any knowledge about the
number of possible categories, apart from the information in the available data. A detailed and extensive presentation of
NPI for multinomial data, considering all relevant aspects and containing detailed proofs and discussions of principles of. All rights reserved.
P.A. Coolen), thomas@stat.uni-muenchen.de (T. Augustin).
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the practically important case of a known number of possible categories, which is closer in nature to the traditional use
of multinomial data. In comparison to the results without such knowledge [8], the inferences in this paper are either the
same, or have less imprecision, in which case the lower and upper probabilities will be nested in the logical manner.
In Section 2, we give brief introductions to A(n), circular-A(n), interval probability and NPI, and to the model underlying our
inferences [8,9]. The main results, NPI-based lower and upper probabilities for the next observation on the basis of multi-
nomial data with a known number of possible categories, are presented in Section 3, where we also formulate some general
properties of these inferences. In Section 4, these results are compared to the IDM(M) and numerical examples are used to
illustrate particular features of these inferences. In Section 5, some additional issues are discussed. An explanation of the der-
ivation of the lower and upper probabilities is provided in an Appendix, together with further details concerning their math-
ematical properties.
2. Nonparametric predictive inference and the underlying model
2.1. A(n) and assumptions for real-valued and circular data
Hill [7] introduced the assumption A(n) as a basis for predictive inference in case of real-valued observations. In his setting,
suppose we have n observations ordered as z1 < z2 <    < zn, which partition the real-line into n + 1 intervals (zj1,zj) for j =
1, . . . ,n + 1, where we use notation z0 = 1 and zn+1 =1. Hill’s assumption A(n) is that a future observation, represented by a
random quantity Zn+1, falls into any such interval with equal precise probability, so we have PðZnþ1 2 ðzj1; zjÞÞ ¼ 1nþ1 for j =
1, . . . ,n + 1. This assumption implies that the rank of Zn+1 amongst the n observed data has equal probability to be any value
in {1, . . . ,n + 1}. This is clearly a post-data assumption, related to exchangeability [10], which provides direct posterior pre-
dictive probabilities [11]. Hill [7,12] argued that A(n) is a reasonable basis for inference in the absence of any further process
information beyond the data set, when actually predicting a future random quantity. In [5] it is shown that nonparametric
predictive inference (NPI) based on A(n) has strong consistency properties in the theory of interval probability [13–15]. In
Corollary 1 it will be shown that the predictive lower and upper probabilities presented in this paper are internally consis-
tent in the same, very strong sense.
In our model, we represent multinomial data as observations on a probability wheel, and hence as circular data. For such
data, A(n) is not suitable, as the data are not represented on the real-line. A straightforward variation, again linked to
exchangeability of n + 1 observations, is the assumption circular-A(n), denoted by [6,8]: Let ordered circular data
x1 < x2 <    < xn create n intervals on a circle, denoted by Ij = (xj,xj+1) for j = 1, . . . ,n  1, and In = (xn,x1). The assumption
is that a future observation Xn+1 falls into each of these n intervals with equal (precise) probability, soPðXnþ1 2 IjÞ ¼ 1n ; for j ¼ 1; . . . ;n: ð1ÞNotice that neither the units of the circular data, nor the chosen 0-point on the circle, are relevant here. Clearly, is again
a post-data assumption, related to the appropriate exchangeability assumption for such circular data, in exactly the same
way as A(n) was related to exchangeability of n + 1 values on the real-line. Hence, NPI based on has the same consis-
tency properties as shown in [5] for such inference based on A(n).
2.2. The probability wheel representation for multinomial data
In this paper, as in [8,9], we use combined with an assumed underlying representation of multinomial data as out-
comes of spinning a probability wheel. As we wish not to make further assumptions about the probability mass 1/n per inter-
val Ij, our predictive inferences are again in the form of interval probabilities [5,13–15], where a lower probability for an
event A is represented by P(A), and the corresponding upper probability by PðAÞ. Effectively, the lower probability is the max-
imum lower bound for the classical probability for A that is consistent with the probabilities as assigned by and in
accordance with the probability wheel model, according to de Finetti’s fundamental theorem of probability [10], and the
upper probability is the minimum upper bound consistent in this way. From a behavioural point of view as advocated by
Walley [13], these can also be interpreted as maximum buying and minimum selling prices, respectively, for which one
judges gambles on the event A to be desirable.
The predictive lower and upper probabilities that will be presented in Section 3 are based on an underlying assumed
model, ensuring that they not only make sense for one speciﬁc set of data, which they by leading to F-probability and
due to the fact that they bound the observed relative frequencies (Corollary 1), but are also consistent if more observations
are added to the data. Such considerations will be discussed in detail in [9], together with the underlying model and the prin-
ciples leading to, and detailed justiﬁcation of, lower and upper probabilities presented in Section 3 and in [8]. Here, we give a
brief summary and justiﬁcation of the key aspects of this model.
The model underlying our nonparametric predictive lower and upper probabilities to be derived in (9) and (11) is based on
a probability wheel representation, with each observation category represented by a single segment of the probability wheel.
The idea of such a probability wheel is as follows (see [16] for use of the same concept as a reference experiment underlying
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any segment of the same size, where a segment is an area between two lines from the center of the circle to its circumference.
In our model for multinomial data, we assume explicitly that each possible observation category is represented by only a sin-
gle segment on the circle. Even more, we assume that there is no natural (or assumed) ordering of the observation categories,
and therefore also no such ordering of the segments on the circle. Clearly, if we had perfect knowledge of the sizes of all seg-
ments on the probability wheel, we would have full knowledge of the probability distribution for future observations from
this multinomial setting. In this paper, we assume that the only information available to us is a ﬁnite number of exchangeable
observations, and the fact that there are at most K possible categories, hence K different segments on the probability wheel. As
this probability wheel is only an abstract model, we have no information about the conﬁguration of different segments on it.
This is important for our nonparametric predictive inferences based on once we consider unions of two or more cate-
gories, and adds to imprecision of our inferences, in the sense that our lower and upper probabilities are optimal bounds over
all conﬁgurations of these K possible segments on the probability wheel.
When we combine this concept of a probability wheel, with each observation category represented by a single segment,
with the assumption , on the basis of n observations, then we can represent this situation as if the n observations are
represented by n lines, which partition the circle into n equally sized slices, representing that the next observation is equally
likely to fall into each one of these slices.1,2 The assumption that each observation category is represented by only one segment
on the probability wheel, implies that the lines representing observations in the same category are ‘next to each other’. For
example, if precisely two observations fall into one category, then our current inferences with regard to the next observation
falling into this category, are based on the current representation with two lines next to each other which both represent this
category, and the other lines, in case of more than two observations, representing different categories. Under the assumption
, the probability 1n for the arrow on the probability wheel corresponding to the next observation to be in between the
two lines representing these observations in the same category, is the lower probability that the next observation belongs to
that same category as well. For the upper probability, we consider all possible conﬁgurations of segments on the probability
wheel, which are consistent with the observations and their corresponding lines on the wheel. The upper probability is then
the maximum amount of probability, under and these data and conﬁgurations, that can be assigned to the segments cor-
responding to the event of interest.
Our assumption that each observation category is represented by a single segment on the probability wheel is essential as
without this assumption our model would lead to vacuous lower and upper probabilities for all non-trivial events.
3. Lower and upper probabilities
3.1. The basic setting
In a multinomial setting, observations belong to categories, with no natural relationships or orderings between these cat-
egories. We assume that there is a known number of possible categories, denoted by K. In this paper, we mostly restrict
attention to KP 3, but the presented approach could also be used for K = 2.3 We assume that each observation can be assigned
to a category with certainty. Our inferences in this paper are based on the assumption that nP 1 observations are available, and
the inferences are predictive, focussing on a single future observation denoted by Yn+1, which is assumed to be exchangeable
with the n observations so far.
We denote the KP 3 possible categories by C1, . . . ,CK. Without loss of generality, we assume that the ﬁrst k of these,
C1, . . . ,Ck for 1 6 k 6 K have already been observed and the last K  k, Ck+1, . . . ,CK have not yet been observed. Let nj be the
number of observations in Cj, so njP 1 for j 2 {1, . . . ,k} and nj = 0 for j 2 {k + 1, . . . ,K}, and n ¼
Pk
j¼1nj. The event of interest
in this paper can generally be denoted by1 We
denotes
2 It m
distribu
indepen
3 How
less impYnþ1 2
[
j2J
Cj ð2Þwith J # {1, . . . ,K}, but except where mentioned explicitly we exclude the trivial events J = ; and J = {1, . . . ,K} from our con-
siderations. LetOJ :¼ J \ f1; . . . ; kg; ð3Þdenote the index-set for the categories in the event of interest that have already been observed, and deﬁneUJ :¼ J \ fkþ 1; . . . ;Kg ð4Þdistinguish carefully in terminology between ‘slice’ and ‘segment’. We call the area of unknown size representing one category ‘segment’, while ‘slice’
the area of size 1/n in between two neighboring lines.
ight be considered natural to introduce parameters corresponding to the unknown segments representing categories, as in the classical multinomial
tion. This is avoided, as it would not be helpful for the further development of the method presented in this paper since we do not use conditional
dence upon parameter values, and we explicitly do not assume inﬁnite exchangeable sequences as would justify the use of such parameters [10].
ever, for the binomial situation with K = 2 NPI can be based on an assumed data representation on a line, as presented by [17], which leads to slightly
recision than a representation on a circle as in this paper.
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use the notations4 All
the not
5 For
with (1
J = ;, th
mentior :¼ jOJj and l :¼ jUJj; ð5Þso 0 6 r 6 k and 0 6 l 6 K  k. This implies that k  r observed categories and K  k  l unobserved categories are not in-
cluded in the event of interest. To simplify presentation, we introduce the notationC½S :¼
[
j2S
Cj; n½S :¼
X
j2S
njfor sets S # {1, . . . ,K}.
To derive the lower and upper probabilities we consider all possible conﬁgurations r on the probability wheel, apply
to each conﬁguration r to obtain corresponding lower and upper predictive probabilities Pr() and PrðÞ, and then take
the lower and upper envelope with respect to the set R of all conﬁgurations:PðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼ min
r2R
PrðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ð6ÞandPðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼ max
r2R
PrðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ: ð7ÞWe ﬁnally obtain:
Theorem 1. For any J # {1, . . . ,K} and with the deﬁnitions in (3), (4) and (5) the NPI-based lower and upper probabilities for
event (2), based on the n observations,4 the assumption and our probability wheel model, are5PðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼1n n½OJ  r þmaxð2r þ l K;0Þ
  ð8Þ
¼ n½J minðK  r  l; rÞ
n
ð9ÞandPðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼1n n½OJ  r þminð2r þ l; kÞ
  ð10Þ
¼ n½J þminðr þ l; k rÞ
n
: ð11ÞProof. The proof of Theorem 1 and more details on the technical handling of our lower and upper predictive probabilities
(9) and (11) as arising from generalized basic probability assignments ([18], cp. also [19]) can be found in the Appendix,
where also those conﬁgurations that minimize Pr(Yn+1 2 C[J]) and maximize PrðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ in (6) and (7) are explicitly
constructed. h3.2. An illustrating example
Before turning to fundamental properties of our model, let us brieﬂy illustrate the general basic idea of our inferences
with an example.
Example 1. Suppose that there are K = 6 possible categories, namely Blue, Red, Yellow, Green, White, Other, henceforth also
indicated by their ﬁrst letter. Suppose that n = 9 observations are available, with the following numbers per category:B 3; R 1; Y  2; G 3; W  0; O 0:
For the lower probability (cf. also Fig. 1) note that the probability assigned to a color that has been observed nj  1 times is at
least (nj  1)/n. This already gives the whole contribution of the color to the lower probability as long as there are enough
colors not in the event of interest to separate the segments, in order to avoid having to attribute further probability mass 1/n
to the slice connecting two neighboring colors in the event of interest. Consequently, we obtain P(B) = 2/9, P(B,R) = 2/9 andprobabilities considered here are predictive given the ﬁrst n observations. So we do not explicitly mention the dependence on the ﬁrst n observations in
ation.
the two trivial events, the NPI-based lower and upper probabilities are obvious. If J = {1, . . . ,K}, the upper probability of event (2) is equal to 1, in line
1), and also the lower probability (9) is equal to 1, which is fully in line with the probability wheel model which underlies our inferences. Similarly, if
e lower probability of event (2) equals 0, in line with (9), and the upper probability (11) is equal to 0. In our further discussion, we will not explicitly
n these trivial events anymore.
Fig. 1. The two conﬁgurations leading to the lower and upper probabilities in Example 1.
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probability of the event {B,R,Y,G}, however, there are no further colors left to separate also Y and G or G and B, and so its lower
probability is 7/9, exceeding (n[OJ]  r)/n.
Similar arguments apply to the derivation of the upper probability. The main difference is that we now want to assign as
much probability mass as possible to the colors in the event of interest, and so we assume that not yet observed colors that
are also not in the event of interest do not occur on the probability wheel at all (or are associated with a segment of area 0).
Again we separate the colors in the event of interest as far as possible, but now with the aim to add probability mass 1/n as
much as possible. This leads to the conﬁguration at the bottom of Fig. 1.3.3. Fundamental properties of NPI-based lower and upper probabilities
We now directly turn to some fundamental properties of the introduced inference method:
Corollary 1. The lower and upper probabilities (9) and (11) satisfy the following properties:
(i) (Conjugacy) For all J # {1, . . . ,K}:6 In t
{B,R,Y,G
produci
probabi
7 Ind
monoto
see two
meaninP Ynþ1 2 C½J
  ¼ 1 P Ynþ1 2 C½f1;...;KgnJg :(ii) For all J # {1, . . . ,K}:P Ynþ1 2 C½J
 
6 n½J
n
6 P Ynþ1 2 C½J
 
:(iii) If n varies, and P(n)() and PðnÞðÞ are the corresponding lower and upper probabilities based on n observations, then, for
every J # {1, . . . ,K}lim
n!1
PðnÞ Ynþ1 2 C½J
  ¼ lim
n!1
PðnÞ Ynþ1 2 C½J
 
:(iv) PðÞ ¼ ½PðÞ; PðÞ is F-probability in the sense ofWeichselberger [14,15], 7 i.e. with p() denoting classical probabilities and
M :¼ pðÞjPðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ 6 pðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ 6 PðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ; 8 J# f1; . . . ;Kg
  ð12Þ
as the so-called structure consisting of all classical probabilities being in accordance with P() and PðÞ, one obtains
PðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼ min
pðÞ2M
pðYnþ1 2 C½JÞhe ﬁgure only one conﬁguration was used for the lower probabilities and only one for the upper probabilities of the events {B}, {B,R}, {B,R,Y} and
}. Indeed, Lemma 2 will guarantee that for every increasing sequence of events there exists such a ‘‘simultaneously least favorable conﬁguration”
ng all the lower probabilities of the elements of the sequence as well as a ‘‘simultaneously most favorable conﬁguration” related to all the upper
lities.
eed the stronger property of two-monotonicity of P() holds (see the proof of Lemma 2). We nevertheless decided to state F-probability – but not two-
nicity – explicitly in a theorem, because we understand being F-probability (and therefore being coherent) as a strong consistency property, while we
-monotonicity only as a technical property merely simplifying calculations in the convenient way given in Theorem 2 but without a vivid inherent
g.
8 Thi
concept
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PðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼ max
pðÞ2M
pðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ:(v) P() and PðÞ are coherent lower and upper probabilities in the sense of Walley [13].
Proof. (i)–(iii) can be demonstrated by elementary methods, where (i) can also be seen as an immediate consequence of (iv).
For (iv) it is helpful to realize that, as described in the Appendix, based on a certain arbitrary conﬁguration r of the
categories on the probability wheel can be formally described by a basic probability assignment mr(), resulting in the belief
function Pr() and the plausibility function PrðÞ. Taking the lower and upper envelopes over all possible conﬁgurations
according to (6) and (7) leads to F-probability [18, Th. 2.3.2]8, which is here, by the lower envelope theorem [13, p. 134], equiv-
alent to coherence. h
Corollary 1 formulates important properties of internal consistency and rationality of our model. Property (ii) distin-
guishes our model as a proper generalization of the naive predictive learning where simply relative frequencies are assigned:
Our model contains the relative frequencies but also reﬂects, by the imprecision, the amount of information on which the
inferences are based. This imprecision vanishes if the sample size tends to inﬁnity (cf. Property iii).
Property (i) shows that upper and lower probability ﬁt to each other in a complementary way. Far beyond this minimal
requirement, according to (iv), our inference leads to F-probability in the sense of Weichselberger [5,14,15]. This proves that
these predictive interval probabilities, based on a particular data representation, are internally consistent in a very strong
sense: The resulting limits are in complete accordance with the induced set of classical (‘precise’) probabilities, and so
the bounds make use of the available information in a perfect manner; they are neither too wide nor do they add unjustiﬁed
additional assumptions to our inferences. Additionally, since on ﬁnite spaces the F-probability property coincides with
coherence in Walley’s sense [13], our bounds are also perfectly rational from the behavioral point of view.
3.4. Random variables and their expectations I: the direct and the indirect method
If we want to apply our model for predictive decision making or classiﬁcation, for instance, we have to go a step further
and associate real-valued outcomes with every category C1, . . . , it CK, i.e. we have to consider random quantities
X : fC1; . . . ;CKg ! R. To determine their lower and upper expectation there are two – seemingly different – ways to proceed:
(a) The direct method copies the derivation of P() and PðÞ from (9) and (11) along the lines of (6) and (7) by replacing
probability with expectation. So, we consider ﬁrstly every conﬁguration r on the probability wheel separately, calcu-
late the corresponding lower and upper expectation ErX and ErX and then consider the envelope over all conﬁgura-
tions r 2 R, resulting in
EX :¼ min
r2R
ErX and EX :¼ max
r2R
ErX: ð13Þ(b) The indirect method uses the predictive lower and upper probabilities from (9) and (11) as the fundamental building
blocks, fromwhich then the lower and upper expectations are derived. As a consequence, we ﬁrst determine our lower
and upper probabilities P() and PðÞ in accordance with the model, and then use the corresponding structureM (cf.
(12)) to deﬁne lower and upper expectations:EMX :¼ inf
p2M
EpX and EMX :¼ sup
p2M
EpX: ð14Þ
From general theory (e.g., [13, p. 81]) it is known that alwaysEMX 6 EX and EX 6 EMX ð15Þ
with strict inequalities being possible, i.e., from the viewpoint of the direct method, the indirect method could lead to
substantial loss of information.3.5. Random variables and their expectation II: fundamental results
It is therefore quite a strong internal consistency property (closeness property) of our model that the inner and the outer
methods will prove to coincide. Moreover, quite important from the applied point of view, we are able to give convenient
expressions for the lower and to upper expectations. They can be calculated in a simple way as weighted sums instead of
solutions to linear optimization problems, which would be needed by relying directly on the deﬁnition.s way to derive P() and PðÞ shows that our inferences are a special case of generalized basic probability assignments [18], see also [19] for a related
.
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(13) to (14), the following two statements can be derived:
(i) Let m() be the Moebius inverse9 of P(), i.e. for every J # {1, . . . ,K}9 It m
success
Append
10 Seem Ynþ1 2 C½J
  ¼X
I# J
ð1ÞjJnIjP Ynþ1 2 C½I
 
; ð16Þ
then
EX ¼ EMX ¼
X
J# f1;...;Kg
m Ynþ1 2 C½J
 
min
j2J
XðCjÞ ð17Þ
and
EX ¼ EMX ¼
X
J# f1;...;Kg
m Ynþ1 2 C½J
 
max
j2J
XðCjÞ: ð18Þ(ii) Let furthermore x(1) < x(2) <    < x(q), q 6 K, be the distinct values of the image of X (ordered in increasing magnitude), and
deﬁne, for i = 1, . . . , q, J(i) = {j 2 {1, . . . ,K}|X(Cj) = x(i)} and IðiÞ :¼ [it¼1JðtÞ; thenEX ¼ EMX ¼ xð1Þ þ
Xq
i¼2
xðiÞ  xði1Þ
   P Ynþ1 2 C½IðiÞ 
and
EX ¼ EMX ¼ xð1Þ þ
Xq
i¼2
xðiÞ  xði1Þ
   P Ynþ1 2 C½IðiÞ :Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix. h4. Comparison with IDM(M) and further examples
In this section, we compare our NPI-based inferences for multinomial data with K possible categories to the Imprecise
Dirichlet model (IDM) [1] and its direct predictive counterpart, the Imprecise Dirichlet-Multinomial model (IDMM) [2],
respectively, in particular by focussing on some speciﬁc situations. We illustrate our method, also to appreciate the differ-
ences with the IDM(M), via some numerical examples. Based on these models, the lower and upper probabilities for the gen-
eral event (2), derived from n observations as described above, arePIDMðMÞðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼ 1nþ s n½OJ
  ð19Þfor J– {1, . . . ,K}, andPIDMðMÞðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼ 1nþ s n½OJ þ s
  ð20Þfor J– ;, with s a positive constant to be chosen independently of the data, where [1] and [2] advocate the use of small values
such as s = 1 or s = 2 to align the resulting inferences with several frequently suggested Bayesian and classical inferences.
It has often been stated, e.g. [1,2], as an important advantage of the IDM(M) that the corresponding inference satisﬁes a
‘Representation Invariance Principle’ (RIP), postulating that lower and upper probabilities should not depend on the sample
space in terms of which the event of interest and the data are represented.10 Our lower and upper probabilities (9) and (11) do
not satisfy the RIP, but as will become obvious from the examples below we do not see this as a disadvantage of our model; even
on the contrary, we will argue that our inferences provide more natural answers in situations where the IDM(M) was judged to
show undesired behavior.
Indeed, the discussants to Walley’s paper [1] raised a number of properties of the IDM which they understand as disad-
vantageous, and some of these concerns were also mentioned and shared by Walley himself. These particularities of the
IDM(M) include the following: (1) The IDM(M) lower probability for the second observation to be equal to the ﬁrst, is 11þs.
The suggested small values of s, in particular s = 1 or s = 2, lead to intuitively surprisingly high values for this lower proba-
bility. As discussed below, in our NPI-based approach, this lower probability is 0. (2) The IDM(M) predictive lower and upper
probabilities depend only on the observed frequency of that category and the total number of observations, which ensuresay be noted explicitly that we do not claim total-monotonicity of P(), i.e. m() to be non-negative. The concept of Moebius inversion can also be
fully applied to simplify computation of lower and upper expectations based on two-monotone and two-alternating set-functions (see, e.g. [20], and the
ix for further details).
also [4] for a detailed discussion of representation invariance.
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probabilities, we illustrate this explicitly in the examples below. (3) The IDM(M) upper probabilities for events that the next
observation is in an as yet unseen category do not depend on the number of categories seen so far. This is not the case for our
NPI-based upper probability, as illustrated in Example 3 below.11
We illustrate our lower and upper probabilities (9) and (11) for some special cases of the general event (2) and available
data, also commenting on the corresponding IDM(M) lower and upper probabilities where useful to highlight differences and
similarities.
It is clearly of interest to consider the NPI-based lower and upper probabilities for events containing only a single cate-
gory. Let us begin with the case that this one category has already been observed, so r = 1, l = 0, and without loss of generality
let us assume that the category of interest is C1, so n1P 1, then11 A fu
and wis
observa
with thPðYnþ1 2 C1Þ ¼ n1  1n ð21ÞandPðYnþ1 2 C1Þ ¼ min n1 þ 1n ;1
 
; ð22Þas we assumed throughout that KP 3. The IDM(M) lower and upper probabilities for this event are n1/(n + s) and (n1 + s)/
(n + s), respectively. Note that our lower probability (21) only becomes positive if n1 > 1, so in this case the NPI-based infer-
ence is quite conservative when compared to the IDM(M) [21].
Secondly, if this one category of interest has not yet been observed, so r = 0, l = 1, and without loss of generality let us
assume that the category of interest is CK, thenPðYnþ1 2 CKÞ ¼ 0 ð23Þ
andPðYnþ1 2 CKÞ ¼ 1n : ð24ÞFor this event, the IDM(M) lower and upper probabilities are 0 and s/(n + s), respectively. We see from the fact that (21)–(24)
do not depend on K that a sort of representation invariance actually holds in our approach for events involving only a single
category. It may be explicitly stressed here that we do not understand general violation of the RIP as problematic. Quite on
the contrary, we think that the RIP is responsible for the counterintuitive properties of the IDM(M) mentioned above, which
are also illustrated in the following examples. We will return to the RIP in the discussion in Section 5, where we also sketch
two alternative principles which could, in our opinion, replace the RIP.
If all r observed categories in the event of interest have been observed exactly once, so nj = 1 for all j 2 OJ, thenPðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼ 1n maxð2r þ l K;0Þ; ð25Þwhich exceeds 0 if and only if K  r  l < r. In this latter case, there are not enough categories available which are not in the
event of interest and for which the corresponding segments in the probability wheel model can be used to separate all r seg-
ments corresponding to observed categories in the event of interest (see also the explanation of the derivation of (9) and (11)
in the Appendix). We illustrate and discuss this lower probability in Example 2. The IDM(M) lower probability for this event
is r/(n + s), which for small values of s is larger than the NPI-based lower probability (25).
For events containing only categories which have not yet been observed, so r = 0 and 1 6 l 6 K  k, the upper probability isPðYnþ1 2 C½UJÞ ¼ 1n minðl; kÞ; ð26Þwhile the corresponding NPI-based lower probability is 0, and the IDM(M) upper probability for this event is s/(n + s) for all
values of l and k. We illustrate and discuss this upper probability later on in Example 3.
Example 2. Suppose that K = 10, n = 20, and k = 5, with n1 = 16 observations in C1, and nj = 1 for j = 2, . . . ,5 in each of
categories C2 to C5. Suppose that interest is in the events Y21 2 C[{2,. . ., 5+l}] for l 2 {0, . . . ,5}, so that the next observation belongs
to any of the categories with a single observation so far or to any of the ﬁrst l not yet observed categories. By (25) the lower
probability for this event is 0 for l 6 2. However, for l 2 {3,4,5} this lower probability is positive, namely (l  2)/20. Of course,
for l = 5 the event of interest is just the complementary event to Yn+1 2 C1, and this lower probability of 3/20 then also follows
by the conjugacy property from the fact that PðYnþ1 2 C1Þ ¼ 17=20 using (22).rther important advantage of our NPI-based approach over the IDM(M) approach appears if one does not know the total number of possible categories,
hes to distinguish in the event of interest between fully deﬁned categories that have not yet been observed, and any new category occurring at the next
tion. Our NPI-based lower and upper probabilities for this situation are presented in [8], where the corresponding inferences are also compared in detail
e IDM(M).
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once is 0, but if many such categories are included in the event of interest, in comparison to the number of included
categories for which the data contain more than one observation, then this lower probability can become positive in our NPI-
based approach.
The IDM(M) gives PIDMðMÞðY21 2 C½f2;...;5þlgÞ ¼ 420þs for all l 2 {0, . . . ,5}, which corresponds naturally to the IDM(M) upper
probability of (16 + s)/(20 + s) for the event Yn+1 2 C1, yet it may be deemed somewhat surprising that it does not at all
depend on the value of l. Most noticeably, of course, is the equality of these IDM(M) lower probabilities for the cases l = 0 and
l = 5, so it does not matter to the IDM(M) whether none or all not yet observed categories are included in the event of
interest.
In this example, one could consider the NPI-based approach to be a bit more conservative for these events than the
IDM(M) approach, as long as small values of s are used for the latter.
Example 3. Suppose that interest is in events expressing that Yn+1 does not belong to any of the categories of the ﬁrst n
observations. The NPI-based lower probability for any such an event is 0, the upper probability is given by (26). The most
general formulation of this event is {Yn+1 2 C[{k+1,. . .,K}]}, but instead one may have an explicit interest in a subset of the
not yet observed categories, {Yn+1 2 C[UJ]}, with l as before the number of elements of UJ. Suppose that K = 40 different cat-
egories are possible, and n = 200 observations are available which belong to k = 5 different categories, C1 to C5. The corre-
sponding NPI-based upper probability that Y201 belongs to any not yet observed category is 5/200, while for the event
that it belongs to any speciﬁc such category, so any from C6 to C40, the upper probability is 1/200, and for any pair of these
35 not yet observed categories the corresponding upper probability is 2/200, and so on up to the upper probability 5/200 for
any subset containing 5 or more of these unobserved categories.
If, instead, the ﬁrst n = 200 observations had been in k = 20 of the 40 different categories, C1 to C20, then the corresponding
NPI-based upper probability that Y201 belongs to any not yet observed category is 20/200, while the similar case with k = 25
categories already observed would lead to the value 15/200 for this upper probability. For subsets consisting of l of the
unobserved categories, the corresponding upper probabilities are l/200 for l 6 k, and k/200 for lP k. These values reﬂect both
how many different categories have already been observed, and how many unobserved categories are still available. The
maximum possible value of such an upper probability is attained for the case where the number k of observed categories is
equal to the number of unobserved categories.
The IDM(M) gives upper probability s/(200 + s) for all the events in this example, as it does not distinguish between such
events with different subsets of the unobserved categories. It also does not take into account k, the number of observed
categories in the 200 observations so far.
Example 4. Table 1 presents the NPI and IDM(M) (with s = 1) lower and upper probabilities for all non-trivial events of inter-
est on Y11, in the case with K = 4 categories and n = 10 observations, with all categories observed and nj = j observations in
category Cj, for j = 1, . . . ,4.
This basic example highlights that for the IDM(M), imprecision, deﬁned as the difference between corresponding upper
and lower probabilities, does not depend on the event of interest12 (we again do not consider the trivial events in this
discussion), whereas imprecision does depend on the event in the NPI-based approach, with imprecision in this example larger
in case J has two elements than for one element (or three of course, by conjugacy which is also illustrated throughout in Table
1). In most situations in our approach, imprecision is larger for events involving unions of categories than for events involving
single categories. In this example, the values are pretty similar, with the NPI-based approach a bit more conservative due to the
small chosen value s = 1 in the IDM(M). In most situations with observations available in all categories, this will be the case, as
the most noticeable differences between the NPI and IDM(M) approaches occur in situations as discussed in Examples 2 and 3.
Both methods also have the intuitively logical properties that the lower and upper probabilities always bound the
corresponding relative frequency of the event of interest in the data, and that the lower and upper probabilities converge to this
relative frequency if the numbers of observations in the categories become large. Moreover, the equivalence of the direct and
indirect method in assigning expectations (cf. Theorem 2) can also be shown to hold for the IDM [23].5. Discussion
In recent years, Walley’s IDM [1] and its predictive counterpart, the IDMM [2], has received increasing attention and
gained popularity for a variety of applications, as is clear from [3] and this special issue of International Journal of Approx-
imate Reasoning. Although our NPI-based inferences, as presented here and in [8,9], are close to corresponding IDM(M) re-
sults in situations with lots of data and known categories, they can differ substantially in other situations as highlighted in
the examples in this paper and in [8]. It is an interesting topic for future research to develop applications based on our NPI-
based method, for example classiﬁcation, and to compare their results with corresponding outcomes from the IDM (e.g. [24–
26]). This is also necessary to investigate the practical relevance of our proposed method.12 For this reason a vivid non-Bayesian interpretation of the IDM(M) sees it as contaminated relative frequencies [22].
Table 1
Lower and upper probabilities obtained from NPI and the IDM(M) based on s = 1 (Example 4)
J P() PðÞ PIDM(M)() PIDMðMÞðÞ n[J]
{1} 0/10 2/10 1/11 2/11 1
{2} 1/10 3/10 2/11 3/11 2
{3} 2/10 4/10 3/11 4/11 3
{4} 3/10 5/10 4/11 5/11 4
{1,2} 1/10 5/10 3/11 4/11 3
{1,3} 2/10 6/10 4/11 5/11 4
{1,4} 3/10 7/10 5/11 6/11 5
{2,3} 3/10 7/10 5/11 6/11 5
{2,4} 4/10 8/10 6/11 7/11 6
{3,4} 5/10 9/10 7/11 8/11 7
{1,2,3} 5/10 7/10 6/11 7/11 6
{1,2,4} 6/10 8/10 7/11 8/11 7
{1,3,4} 7/10 9/10 8/11 9/11 8
{2,3,4} 8/10 10/10 9/11 10/11 9
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ward to extend it to any number of future observations, via sequential arguments. Any statistical approach must have con-
sistency properties for updating and conditioning. We discuss these important features in detail in [5] and [9], where it is
emphasized that updating and conditioning are very different actions. Updating involves learning from more observations,
and adapting inferences to this. This is naturally done in the NPI framework by taking all new data into account together
with the previously available data, and basing predictive inference on the appropriate Að~nÞ or assumption with ~n
the new total number of observations. Conditioning, on the other hand, typically involves taking speciﬁc additional informa-
tion on the random quantity of interest, Yn+1, into account. For both these actions, strong consistency results hold for NPI,
more details will be presented in [9].
As discussed in Section 4, and in [8], the RIP does not generally hold for the NPI-based inferences. Hence, our inferences
can depend on the choice of categories used to represent the data. We believe that this is a natural feature of statistical infer-
ence based on lower and upper probabilities. We would consider the RIP a reasonably logical principle from the perspective
of classical probability, where a precise probability for such inferences should be close to the proportion of observations in
the categories speciﬁed in the event of interest. However, from the substantially wider perspective of interval probability
theory, it is natural that the difference between corresponding lower and upper probabilities depends on the amount of
information available and the data representation. A more detailed data representation allows more detailed inferences,
but since it will imply less information on one or more categories, the price for such more detailed inferences can be greater
imprecision. This feature of our method is similar in nature to the effects of increasing the number of parameters in a sta-
tistical model, which allows the information from the data to be taken into account in more detail, and hence leads to im-
proved model ﬁt but tends to cause loss of predictive power. In our inferences, this latter aspect occurs in the form of
possibly more, but never less, predictive imprecision in case of a more detailed data representation. Generally speaking,
our NPI-based inferences for multinomial data are minimally imprecise if, for the event of interest, the data available are only
recorded in a binary mode, so counting how often the event did or did not occur in the past. It is crucial here to emphasize
that, once a data representation has been chosen, the corresponding inferences should not be judged from the perspective of
actually knowing more details of the data. In [9] more attention will be paid to this feature, suggesting a general property
relating imprecision in inference to the level of detail of the data representation (sample space) that is weaker than the RIP,
but also trivially satisﬁed by any method satisfying the RIP.
In formulating these principles, we have, as argued above, the impression that the RIP may be too much inﬂuenced by the
classical concept of probability, without using the full expressive power of imprecise probabilities. While in the area of pre-
cise probabilities there is a simple and hard dichotomy – two assignments are either the same or they are contradictory – the
concept of imprecision allows for a third possibility: assignments can be different without being contradictory. So we ﬁnd it
more convincing to replace the RIP by two principles.
(1) Inferences based on different data representations must not be conﬂicting.
(2) Parsimonity: Finer representations do not lead, ceteris paribus, to less imprecision.
These principles demand that the inferences based on nested representations are nested in a natural way, but need not
necessarily coincide.
On the other hand, the IDM(M) may also be judged to be superior over our NPI-based approach. In particular, as it is a
parametric model in the Bayesian framework, it allows a wider range of inferences than our approach, and it is easily
adapted to enable prior judgements to be formally taken into account. In our NPI-based method, inference is necessarily re-
stricted to predictive events, but quite many inferences of practical interest can be naturally formulated in a predictive man-
ner, see for example [27–31]. In quite a straightforward manner, our NPI-approach for multinomial data can also be
F.P.A. Coolen, T. Augustin / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 217–230 227extended to take subcategories into account, as is e.g. important for hierarchical classiﬁcation, handling situations where, in
terms of our ﬁrst example using colors, for example a main category ‘Blue’ might be subdivided into ‘Light Blue’, ‘Dark Blue’
and ‘Other Blue’. This is achieved by taking all orderings of these subcategories within the main category into account on the
probability wheel, the main idea of this generalization is presented and illustrated in [32].
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In this Appendix, we start with describing our inferences more formally by representing them via (generalized) basic
probability assignments ([18], cp. also [19]). In a second step we derive the bounds formulated in (9) and (11), proving The-
orem 1. Finally, Theorem 2 is shown.
A.1. Representation as (generalized) basic probability assignments
For our inferences we have to study all possible conﬁgurations on the probability wheel, together with the lower and
upper probabilities arising from them. For that purpose, identify every category Cj, j = 1, . . . ,K, with the corresponding index
j and consider the set R of all permutations r of {1, . . . ,K}, where (some of) the not yet seen categories, i.e. some indices, may
simply not be visible, so they can be interpreted as corresponding to segments of area 0 on the probability wheel. Then every
conﬁguration corresponds to the ﬁnite (circular) sequence r = (r(i))i=1,. . .,K+1 with r(K + 1): = r(1).
Fixing a certain conﬁguration, i.e. a certain permutation r, the lower and upper probabilities Pr() and PrðÞ arising from
applying to that conﬁguration can be derived from noting that deﬁnes the following basic probability assignment
mr() on the events {Yn+1 2 C}, C # {C1, . . . ,CK}.
For all categories Cj observed at least twice, assigns basic probability number
nj1
n to the event {Yn+1 2 Cj}; for the
categories which were never observed or observed only once, the corresponding basic probability number is zero. While
these assignments actually do not depend on the concrete conﬁgurations, the ordering of categories comes into the argu-
ment when distributing the masses among the slice between two observed categories. Which observed categories lie next
to each other, as well as which not (yet) observed categories are between them, depends on the concrete conﬁguration under
consideration. To formulate the corresponding basic probability assignment mr(), some further notation is needed: Let
r(i1),r(i2),r(i3), . . . ,r(ik),r(ik+1), with r(ik+1) = r(i1), be the (circular) subsequence enumerating the indices of the already ob-
served categories. Then the slice between two observed categories Crði‘Þ and Crði‘þ1Þ can be described by the set
Jr,‘: = {j|r(i‘) 6 r(j) 6 r(i‘+1)}, ‘ = 1, . . . ,k, and we obtain.
Lemma 1. For every conﬁguration r on the probability wheel, leads to the following basic probability assignment mr():mrðfYnþ1 2 CjgÞ ¼ max nj  1n ;0
 
; j ¼ 1; . . . ;K; ðA:1Þ
mrðfYnþ1 2 C½Jr;‘ gÞ ¼
1
n
; ‘ ¼ 1; . . . ; k ðA:2Þ
mrðfYnþ1 2 CgÞ ¼ 0; else: ðA:3ÞBased on this, we can derive, again for ﬁxed conﬁguration r, the corresponding belief and plausibility functions Pr() and
PrðÞ:Pr Ynþ1 2 C½J
  ¼X
I# J
mrðfYnþ1 2 C½IgÞ ¼
X
j2J
mrðfYnþ1 2 CjgÞ þ
X
Jr;‘ # J
mrðfYnþ1 2 C½Jr;‘ gÞ ¼
X
j2OJ
nj  1
n
þ ‘jJr;‘# J
 
n
; ðA:4ÞandPr Ynþ1 2 C½J
  ¼ X
I\J–;
mrðfYnþ1 2 C½IgÞ ¼
X
j2J
mrðfYnþ1 2 CjgÞ þ
X
Jr;‘\J–;
mrðfYnþ1 2 C½Jr;‘ gÞ
¼
X
j2OJ
nj  1
n
þ ‘jJr;‘ \ J–;
 
n
: ðA:5Þ
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When looking for the ’least favorable’ and the ’most favorable’ conﬁguration producing the lower and upper probability,
the second summand in (A.4) and (A.5) is decisive.13
For the lower bound we want to put as little probability mass as possible to the segments belonging to the event of inter-
est. In terms of (A.4) this means that we choose that r where jf‘jJr;‘# Jgj is minimized. For that purpose we separate the
categories in the event of interest as far as possible.
For the general event (2) considered, and notation used, in this paper, there are r + l categories in the event of interest, and
K  r  l categories not in the event of interest, which can be used for that separation. As a consequence, we have to distin-
guish two cases: First, if r 6 K  r  l, so the number of possible categories not in the event of interest is not less than the
number of already observed categories in that event, then there are sufﬁcient slices possible on the probability wheel to en-
able a conﬁguration such that no segments corresponding to different already observed categories are next to each other,
and the second summand in (A.4) can be made zero. This clearly leads to13 seePðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼
X
j2OJ
nj  1
n
 
¼ 1
n
X
j2OJ
nj  r
 !
: ðA:6ÞSecondly, if r > K  r  l then not all previously observed Cj in the event of interest can be separated by categories not in the
event of interest, the best we can do is to separate as many as possible, so use all K  r  l categories not in the event of inter-
est to separate as many of the r segments as possible. This leaves r  (K  r  l) = 2r + l  K segments, each between two lines
representing previous observations in different categories, that cannot be separated by categories not in the event of interest
and therefore contributing to the second summand in (A.4). Therefore, we obtainPðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼
X
j2OJ
nj  1
n
þ 2r þ l K
n
; ðA:7Þwhich together with (A.6) proves the general expression (9) for the lower probability.
Now we consider the upper probability (11), i.e. we want to make the second summand in (A.5) as large as possible. For
this purpose, all possible categories that have not yet been observed and that are not in the event of interest are considered
to be represented by a segment with area of size 0 on the circle. Hence, we only need to consider the probability mass that
cannot be assigned to the event of interest, which is due to the k  r already observed categories which are not in the event of
interest. Again we consider two cases: First, if k  r 6 r + l, so if k 6 2r + l, then there are sufﬁcient categories in the event of
interest to ensure that no two observed categories not in it have to be next to each other. Hence there is a conﬁguration r for
which all k segments in between two lines representing different observations on the probability wheel have at least one of
these two lines belonging to a segment representing a category in the event of interest, i.e. where Jr,‘ \ J– ;. This leads di-
rectly toPðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼
X
j2OJ
nj  1
n
þ k
n
: ðA:8ÞSecondly, if k  r > r + l, so if k > 2r + l, then some slices between two neighboring lines representing observations in different
categories cannot be included in the event of interest, as there are more such segments than there are categories (either ob-
served or not) in the event of interest. Clearly, there are k  r  (r + l) = k  2r  l such segments, so from the k segments with
corresponding basic probability number 1n in (A.2), there are optimally k  (k  2r  l) = 2r + l such segments to the event of
interest. Hence, in this case the upper probability isPðYnþ1 2 C½JÞ ¼
X
j2OJ
nj  1
n
þ 2r þ l
n
; ðA:9Þwhich gives together with (A.8) the general expression (9) for the upper probability.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For every increasing sequenceS of index sets J(i) # {1, . . . ,K}, J(i) # J(j), i 6 j, there is a permutation r0 2 R such that
P Ynþ1 2 C½JðiÞ
  ¼ Pr0 Ynþ1 2 C½JðiÞ  for all i: ðA:10ÞProof of Lemma 2. Note that in (A.10) the conﬁguration r0 is required to be the same for all elements of the sequence, and
so this lemma states that for every sequence there is a ‘most favorable conﬁguration’ in which for all elements of the increas-
ing sequence the upper probability is attained simultaneously. To construct such a conﬁguration let, without loss of gener-also Example 2.
Fig. A.1. Constructing the ‘most favorable conﬁguration’ in the proof of Lemma 2.
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ing the indices of the already observed categories in the order in which they enter the events in the sequence S, and
rS;unobs ¼ j1; j2; . . . ; jKk be the corresponding subsequence based on the unobserved categories, again in the order in which
they enter the elements of the sequence S. We try to separate the observed categories as much as possible to ensure that
the number of slices ‘in between’ attributing to the second summand in (A.5) becomes as large as possible. For that purpose
we look at that conﬁguration where the elements of the subsequence rS;obs are permuted in the following way (cf. also
Fig. A.1):i1; ik1; i2; ik2; . . . ; ik: ðA:11Þ
We complete the corresponding conﬁguration adding the elements of rS;unobs from the right between elements of rS;obs in
(A.11), i.e., anti-clockwise on the probability wheel, as long as there is enough space on the wheel. Then, when looking at
the elements of S, the upper probability, as long as it remains smaller than 1, increases for every j 2 J(i) by njþ1n if category
j is among the categories seen so far and by 1n if not. This exactly coincides with PðÞ for all events corresponding to elements
of S. h
An immediate consequence of the lemma is that P() is two-monotone and PðÞ is two-alternating (cf., e.g., [20], Prop 11).
Therefore, by applying results on the Choquet integral (e.g. [20], Prop 10, Cor 4), the lower and upper expectations EMX and
EMX can be determined as described.
The proof of the equality on the left hand side in (17) is done in three steps: Firstly note that, for every conﬁguration r, the
corresponding lower expectation ErX arises from minimizing EpX over the corresponding structureMr, and soEX ¼ min
r2r
ErX ¼ min
r2R
min
p2Mr
EpX: ðA:12ÞThe second step consists in recalling that for every F-probability ﬁeld on ﬁnite sample spaces it is sufﬁcient for calculating
lower expectations to conﬁne consideration to the set EðMÞ of extreme points of the structureM:EMX ¼ min
p2EðMÞ
EpX: ðA:13ÞFinally, the fact is utilized that in the case of two-monotone lower interval limit P() the set EðMÞ is obtained by considering
just all the sequences of the form described in Lemma 2 (cf., e.g., [20]). Consequently, Lemma 2 tells us that EðMÞ#Sr2RMr,
which leads tomin
p2EðMÞ
EpX Pmin
r2R
min
p2Mr
EpX: ðA:14ÞCombining (A.12), (A.13) and (A.14) givesEMX ¼ min
p2EðMÞ
EpX Pmin
r2R
min
p2Mr
EpX ¼ EX:Together with (15) this proves the equivalence of the direct and the indirect method for the lower expectation; analogous
arguments can be applied to the upper expectation.
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